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Abstract
This paper proposes self-organization as a method to improve the efficiency and
adaptability of bureaucracies and similar social systems. Bureaucracies are described
as networks of agents, where the main design principle is to reduce local “friction”
to increase local and global “satisfaction”. Following this principle, solutions are pro-
posed for improving communication within bureaucracies, sensing public satisfaction,
dynamic modification of hierarchies, and contextualization of procedures. Each of
these reduces friction between agents (internal or external), increasing the efficiency of
bureaucracies. “Random agent networks” (RANs), novel computational models, are
introduced to illustrate the benefits of self-organizing bureaucracies.
1 Introduction
Bureaucracies can be found in governments, corporations, and other social institutions. They
have social goals and responsibilities that are achieved by a division of labor that is usually
hierarchical. Examples of bureaucracies can be seen with tax collection systems, immigra-
tion services, and steering of educational and academic institutions. The efficiency of a
bureaucracy is related to the fulfillment of its goals. Thus, it would be desirable to increase
functional efficiency in bureaucracies. Ideally, such a system could be designed to reach
maximal efficiency. In practice, as most people have experienced, this is far from being the
case (Weber, 1968). Corruption, rigidity, and delays are just few examples of obstacles that
hamper efficiency in bureaucracies. It would be na¨ıve to aim for perfect bureaucracies, but
certainly the efficiency of actual ones can be improved.
One approach would consist of optimizing the bureaucratic functionality, e.g. (Hofacker and Vetschera, 2001).
This approach can provide good solutions if the function or goal of the organization does not
change considerably, i.e. when a problem domain is static. However, the world is changing
at accelerating rates. Changes cause the shifting of the optimum of a system. And in some
cases, the behaviour of the institution itself changes the optimum (Kauffman, 2000). Thus,
a wiser approach would be to design bureaucracies that are able to adapt (Holland, 1975)
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to changing situations. Instead of attempting to predict all the functionality beforehand, an
organization could adapt to the changing demands of its environment.
Cybernetics and systems theory proposed some of the first solutions in this direction
already a few decades ago, e.g. (Beer, 1966). The Cybersyn project in Chile was even
partially implemented, but was cut short by the 1973 military coup (Miller Medina, 2005).
However, this approach is still not widely used in practice, probably because it requires
alternative ways of thinking. It is always easier to solve problems for static domains than
for dynamic environments.
Organization science has developed several concepts that are useful for improving the self-
organization and adaptation of bureaucracies. Noting the cognitive limits of decision makers
(March, 1978; Simon, 1982; Cyert and March, 1992) tells us that individuals will not be able
to make perfect decisions. On one hand, the cognition necessary to solve complex tasks can
be distributed (Hutchins, 1995; Weick and Roberts, 1993). On the other hand, organizations
need to be able to adapt to unpredictable events (Carley, 1997). Organizational learning is
one type of adaptation that has been widely studied (Levitt and March, 1988). Also, com-
putational organization theory (Carley and Prietula, 1994) and agent based modelling, e.g.
(Epstein and Axtell, 1996; Axelrod, 2005), have aided in the understanding of the complex-
ity inherent to organizations (Anderson et al., 1999; Anderson, 1999; Levinthal and Warglien, 1999;
Lissack, 1999; Axelrod and Cohen, 2000)
Following this line of research, this work suggests methods that improve the efficiency
of bureaucracies via self-organization. In the next section, a notion of self-organization is
introduced, for then presenting general ideas for the design of self-organizing systems. In the
following sections, different aspects of bureaucracies, and self-organizing improvements are
proposed, namely in the areas of communication, sensors, hierarchies, and context. After-
wards, random agent networks (RANs) are defined to model bureaucracies. Computational
experiments with RANs illustrate the benefits of self-organization for improving the perfor-
mance of abstract bureaucracies.
2 Self-organization
Self-organization (Heylighen, 2003) has been used as a principle in many domains such as
computer science and robotics (Kohonen, 2000), the Internet (Bollen and Heylighen, 1996),
and traffic light control (Gershenson, 2005), just to name a few. In organization science,
self-organization has been studied as a phenomenon, e.g. (Comfort, 1994; Morgan, 1996,
p.233). The goal of this work is to use it conceptually as a tool to improve the efficiency of
bureaucracies.
Even when it has been widely studied and applied in many domains, self-organization is
a concept difficult to define (Gershenson and Heylighen, 2003). Nevertheless, for practical
purposes, a notion can suffice: A system described as self-organizing is one in which elements
interact in order to achieve dynamically a global function or behavior (Gershenson, 2006).
A classical example can be seen with flocks of birds, or schools of fish: there is no leader in
the group, and all individuals follow local rules, interacting with their neighbors, and only
this produces coherent global behaviour. In a similar way, local rules of interaction can be
designed, to produce dynamically robust and adaptive behaviours. In this work, some of
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such rules are proposed, as a way to improve the performance of bureaucracies.
3 Designing Self-organizing Systems
Organizations can be modelled as systems of information processing agents (Radner, 1993;
Van Zandt, 1998; DeCanio and Watkins, 1998). An agent is a description of an entity that
acts on its environment. They could also be described as cognitive systems (Gershenson, 2004a).
Thus, not only people in a bureaucracy can be described as agents, but also departments,
ministries, and whole bureaucracies. Agents can have goals (Simon, 1964), that are described
by an observer. Agents can be said to be cognitive because they need to “know” which ac-
tions to take to reach their goals. The “satisfaction” of the agents will be related to the
achievement of their goals. Thus, a description of a bureaucracy can be made in terms of
agents trying to fulfill goals to increase their satisfaction. The public can also be described
as an agent or several agents, interacting (externally) with the bureaucracy.
However, the satisfaction of one agent (e.g. a clerk) can be in conflict with the satisfaction
of another agent (e.g. the minister). It can be argued that decreasing the “friction” or
interference of agents at one level (e.g. personal level), i.e. how one agent decreases the
satisfaction of another agent, will result in an increase of satisfaction at the higher level (e.g.
ministry level) (Gershenson, 2006; Helbing and Vicsek, 1999). If one agent at the lower
level is not satisfied, i.e. does not accomplish its goals, the satisfaction of the system may be
reduced. However, if all agents at the lower level fulfill their goals, then the satisfaction of
the system should be maximal. This is a (useful) tautology because the goals of agents are
described by observers according to the desired function of the system. Notice that this is
different from implying that increasing the satisfaction of agents at one level will always lead
to an increase of satisfaction at the higher level. The key difference lies in the mediation of
conflictive goals to increase satisfaction. Similarly, we can speak about “negative friction”,
or synergy (Haken, 1981), where the behaviour of one agent increases the satisfaction of
another agent. Certainly, not only friction should be minimized, but also synergy maximized.
Different ways in which this can be achieved are discussed in (Gershenson, 2006). Friction
reduction and synergy promotion will be always useful, since all actors, internal or external,
will be benefitted. For example, the easier it is to pay taxes, the more people that will
pay them. This benefits the state (more money collected) and taxpayers (less time lost).
Certainly, as in most social systems, a problem will remain when it comes to measuring
satisfaction. This will be discussed in Section 5.
The goals of a firm can be easily related to its profits (Van Zandt, 1998). However, the
goals of a bureaucracy are related to its particular function. This function can be code-
termined by the state, by the public, and by the bureaucracy itself. Thus, there is yet no
general way to measure the performance of a bureaucracy. Efficiency could be a way of
evaluating a bureaucracy, but there is the same measurement problem with efficiency: it
will differ accordingly to the particular bureaucracy. Still, a lack of explicit descriptions of
function, efficiency, or satisfaction are not a limit for speaking about the goals of a bureau-
cracy. It should just be considered that these can change depending on the behaviour of the
bureaucracy itself.
In order to adapt to unpredictable changes, bureaucracies require a certain flexibility.
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Changes should be made, but the function needs to be preserved. Robustness is required
(Jen, 2005), so that adaptive changes do not prevent the bureaucracy from reaching its
goals. The main idea to guide changes is the following: First, detect how each agent affects
satisfaction of others. Then, implement changes to minimize friction and promote synergy.
This can be achieved by reinforcement: behaviours that have proven themselves inefficient
should be avoided, and beneficial ones should be promoted.
Before implementing radical changes, computer simulations should be used (Axelrod, 2005).
These will be useful for detecting possible flaws in the changes planned, or simply to im-
prove them. Moreover, the changes themselves can be explored with the aid of computer
simulations, since it is not obvious in every case what should be done, as the complexity of
bureaucracies exceeds our predictive capabilities.
The changes could be introduced gradually and with a certain redundancy to compare
the benefits and disadvantages of the new methods with the previous ones.
In the following sections particular aspects of bureaucracies are explored, suggesting
possible improvements within each domain.
4 The Role of Communication
Communication between agents can be classified in two categories: synchronous and asyn-
chronous (Desanctis and Monge, 1999).
Synchronous communication occurs when the agents involved in the process are respond-
ing at the same time. There is immediate feedback between speaker and listener, so that
a dialogue can be established continuously. Examples of this are verbal communication,
telephone conversations, video conferencing, and IRC (Internet relay chat). The advantage
of this mode of communication is that dialogues can be resolved without interruption. The
disadvantage is that all participants need to coordinate to participate in the process.
Asynchronous communication occurs when the agents involved do not participate simul-
taneously in the process. There is a delayed feedback between agents, so that dialogues
are interrupted depending on the length of the transmission delay. Examples include post,
telegraph, telex, fax, e-mail, and instant messaging. The tradeoffs of this mode of communi-
cation complement those of synchronous communication: on the positive side asynchronous
communication allows exchanges without coordination required, but on the negative side the
communication can be delayed. Technological development has reduced transmission delay,
enabling asynchronous communication to depend only on the constraints of the agents.
In a bureaucracy, different agents need to communicate to satisfy the goals of the system.
Thus, communication delays can be seen as a type of friction between agents. The faster
the communication takes place, the better it will be for the system. Thus, synchronous
communication might be preferred to enable quick responses. However, this would imply a
great coordination effort, since agents usually perform other activities apart from communi-
cating. It could be quite possible that an agent would be busy with other matters to have a
synchronous exchange. Then it seems that asynchronous communication would be preferred,
since one agent can send a message and keep on working on other matters while the response
arrives. Then the question would be: how can asynchronous communication be facilitated?
As mentioned above, one great improvement is given by technology. Being able to send
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documents electronically instead of postally reduces the delay of message transmission from
the scale of days to the scale of seconds. Certainly, organizations have exploited this op-
portunity, and worries about security have been solved with digital signatures. Still, it is a
common practice in several bureaucracies to handle paper documents, even when they must
be sent across continents, as it is the case e.g. with the Mexican foreign services.
However, the adoption of electronic means of communication can do much more than
reducing the transmission delay of messages. Analyzing the times when a message is sent
and when it is replied can provide very useful information, namely that of response delay (see
Figure 1). This can be used to detect bottlenecks: If one agent (individual or department)
takes too long in replying requests, the work of other agents might be delayed as well, as in a
production chain. Resources could then be reassigned in real time to overcome the bottleneck,
giving priority to the agent with the response delay. In fact, we can say that a delay in
response causes friction to other agents, since they need the feedback to reach their goals.
Thus, a bureaucracy could self-organize by modifying in real time its own structure, once it
is known where friction is coming from. Solutions can vary depending on the precise nature
of the delay: assign more individuals to a department, replace individual(s), or reorganize
departments. Like this, efficiency of the bureaucracy would be improved. It would be self-
organizing, because the changes are dictated by the behaviour of the bureaucracy itself. The
changes would imply learning in the organization from its experience, while enabling it to
adapt constantly to changes of its environment.
Figure 1: Asynchronous communication. Technology has reduced transmission delays, and
can help to detect and decrease response delays.
5
The response delay would depend on several factors: decision delay (the time it takes
the agent to respond), delay from previous tasks (the time it takes an agent to start making
a decision), and delay from other responses (the time it takes other agents to respond to
the agent’s requirements) (see Figure 2). Each of these delays should be taken into account
while modifying the bureaucracy.
Figure 2: Response delay can be decomposed in previous task delay, other response delay,
and decision delay.
Another benefit of electronic logs is that they can be used to provide accountability of
decisions, as it was the case for the Enron e-mail dataset 1. The workload of individual
agents or departments could also be measured by the number of requests they send or
receive, considering the decision delays required by each request. Finally, a visualization of
the interactions within the bureaucracy (who communicates with who) could provide insights
to improve its design, for example detecting redundant agents or interactions, or creating
“shortcuts” between agents that communicate frequently via other agents.
4.1 Decision Delays
Technology has also aided in the reduction of decision delays. Electronic databases pro-
vide instant information, while in a physical repository a clerk has to search an archive for
documents. The role of the clerk is taken by software in an electronic database. Similarly,
1See http://www.cs.cmu.edu/˜enron/
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monotonous decisions can be taken by computer systems near instantly, reducing decision
delays. An example of this can be seen with bank credit evaluation (Hand and Henley, 1997),
where a computer system can give instant decisions on wether to give credit to an applicant
or not. Similar methods could be used to make instant decisions to judge e.g. visa applicants
or prospective students. Turning decisions into computer systems will reduce decision delays,
thus reducing friction, improving communication, and increasing the bureaucracy efficiency.
This is precisely one of the directions agent technology is taking (Luck et al., 2005), using
notions of negotiation, trust, and reputation to facilitate the coordination of electronic deci-
sion makers. Also research and technology applied to e-government (Layne and Lee, 2001)
and computer aided decision making (Turban and Aronson, 1997; Stahl, 2006) will improve
the performance of bureaucracies.
Such a hybrid scenario, where humans and agents interact in an organization, has been
described with the term “cognitive stigmergy” (Ricci et al., 2006). Stigmergy is used to
describe systems, such as insect colonies, that exploit their environment to communicate
and coordinate (Theraulaz and Bonabeau, 1999). In a similar way, computer systems can
be used as an environment to facilitate the communication, coordination, and decision of
agents.
5 The Role of Sensors
In the previous section, reduction of friction within the bureaucracy was discussed. In this
section, reduction of friction between the bureaucracy and its environment, namely the
public, will be discussed.
Much research has been made in decision making, e.g. (Simon, 1976). It is clear that
without proper sensors there will not be enough information to make proper decisions. Still,
even with simple sensors, a system can obtain much information from its surroundings.
An example can be seen with people who perceive their environment with a walking stick,
sensing by pressure only one point in space. Integrating information in time, they are able
to obtain relevant information to navigate through complex areas. Nevertheless, complex
sensors can reduce the complexity of a decision making process, by “digesting” relevant
information. Therefore, bureaucracies should aim at developing fine sensors to perceive
and digest information relevant to their goals. In any case, without proper sensors, proper
decisions cannot be made.
One element that facilitates the sensing process is public participation, since people
themselves digest and feed the information to the bureaucracy. However, many people are
reluctant to participate in such processes, since they do not see any benefit for it, while
it takes some of their time. An alternative would be to reconstruct public opinion from a
limited set of the population, as polls have been doing, and novel methods could improve,
e.g. (Rodriguez and Steinbock, 2004). Here, only improvement of sensors that do not require
public participation will be discussed.
In order to measure the efficiency of a bureaucracy, sensors should be used. A popular
variable related to this efficiency is public satisfaction: if the public is happy with the services
provided by the bureaucracy, then its efficiency can be assumed. Polls have been used to
measure public satisfaction, but demand a certain effort from public and resources to design
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and analyze them. Also, they cannot measure all possible mishaps.
Thus, bureaucracies should develop sensors for public satisfaction that do not require
public participation. This could be done measuring the public attention delay, which would
be the sum of the waiting delay (how much time a person needs to queue) and the procedure
delay (how much time a person needs to interact with the bureaucracy). Another indicator
would be the frequency of interaction, namely how many times the same person needs to
interact with the bureaucracy. These delays can be considered as friction between the bu-
reaucracy and the public, and should be minimized. Both the public and the bureaucracy
will be satisfied if they need to interact with each other as few as possible (low interaction
frequency), and each of these interactions takes as little time as possible (low public atten-
tion delay). Like this, the precise places where bottlenecks arise, and for which cases, can be
detected, and measures can be taken. For example, if a procedure for a special type of license
takes consistently more time than others, this procedure should be revised and adapted.
One could argue that bureaucracies do not need to care for the public, since they can be
considered as monopolies. But the tendency towards improving bureaucratic services refutes
this argument. For example, e-government practically eliminates the waiting delays. It is
beneficial for political parties in office to improve bureaucratic services to increase public
satisfaction, and thus more votes for the next election. Natural selection will give better
chances of survival to political parties that satisfy pubic demands. Certainly, this can only
happen in countries with a certain degree of political diversity. Otherwise, indeed the state
would be a monopoly.
6 The Role of Hierarchies
Hierarchies are certainly useful for organizations (Helbing et al., 2006). A problem might
arise when these are too rigid and changes are necessary for adaptation. Moreover, when
several aspects should be dealt by a bureaucracy, it might be that one agent should be above
another in some aspect (e.g. logistics), whereas in a different aspect the opposite might be
the case (e.g. legal advice).
Ashby’s law of requisite variety (Ashby, 1956) tells us that a system needs to have enough
variety to respond to the variety of its environment (the word variety here could be sub-
stituted for the word complexity). A hierarchy could also be necessary for coping with
environmental complexity (Aulin, 1979). Multiscale analysis (Bar-Yam, 2005) is a formal
tool that can be used to determine when a hierarchy is required. Basically, if the complex-
ity of an environment cannot be coped by individual agents, these need to aggregate and
coordinate to cope collectively. The organizational relations between agents lead naturally
to hierarchies.
To visualize hierarchies, bureaucracies can be represented as networks (Strogatz, 2001;
Newman, 2003), where each node represents an agent (at a particular scale), and edges
represent interactions between agents. Certainly, a network representing a bureaucracy
will not be homogenous, since different roles are taken by different agents. A hierarchical
bureaucracy can also be represented as a network (Figure 3a). As the complexity (variety)
demanded by the bureaucracy’s environment increases, the diversity of roles and interactions
also augments. A solution would be to increase the number of agents, but this would lead to
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longer communication delays. A better alternative would be to increase the interaction types
between the existing agents, to avoid the introduction of new actors while coping with the
required complexity. These new interactions might change the strictly hierarchical nature of
the bureaucracy. However, even when the bureaucracy might be highly distributed, a certain
hierarchy will always be found, simply because the network is not random nor homogeneous,
i.e. there will always be agents with more weight in the network’s function than others
(Figure 3b).
In a system where too many agents need to interact at once, such as the European Union
with its current twenty five members, the complexity of the interactions may be too difficult
to manage. Modularity can help in coping with the complexity (Simon, 1996). Following
the EU example, it will be less complicated if some decisions are made e.g. by five groups of
five countries, and then these five groups discuss a final decision, than having all members
discussing at once. This is because the decision delays of each agent add up, since agents
(in theory) need to listen to other agents before making a decision. In the modular case,
discussions can go in parallel, so it would take five decision delays for the first round, and
five for the second round, ten in total. In the plain case, it would take twenty five decision
delays to have a discussion. Certainly, too many modules would also create delays. A
balance should be sought where agents can make decisions and interact as efficiently as
possible. What is important is to note that modularity in a network also implies a certain
hierarchy (Figure 3c). The size of modules will also be limited by the cognitive abilities of
the agents (Miller, 1956), so in principle each human agent should not have more than seven
interactions. Common sense would tell us that other types of agent should also keep the
number of interactions low.
A desirable property of bureaucratic networks will be that they have a “small world”
topology (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). This means that most interactions between agents
will not need many intermediaries. This is important for information transfer, again, to
reduce communication delays. Simply ensuring that messages do not need to pass through
several agents before reaching their destination will result in a small world effect, because
like this the agents that need to be connected will be connected. If the same message
needs to pass from agent A to agent B, to finally reach agent C, it might be worthwhile
to simplify and do a shortcut from A to C (Figure 3d). This same idea was posed by
(Bollen and Heylighen, 1996) to improve website navigation by dynamically creating direct
links between pages that users reached via other pages.
In this scenario, a bureaucratic hierarchy is dynamic and changing when necessary, adapt-
ing to changes of its environment directed by friction reduction. Again, these changes can
be said to be self-organizing, because the restructuration comes from within the institution,
directed by its own dynamics.
7 The Role of Context
In order to cope with complexity, any organization will try to simplify procedures. Ab-
stracting from several instances, details can be omitted, and a uniform approach can be
taken to deal with new instances, internal and external. For example, the public tends to be
treated uniformly. This makes sense in cases when there are not many differences between
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Figure 3: Hierarchy represented as a network. a) Strict hierarchical network. b) As interac-
tions and dependencies increase, strict hierarchy is broken, but still far from homogeneous.
c) Modules can be created when too many interactions cause delays. d) “Shortcuts” can be
made to avoid intermediaries. Links can also be removed or modified, as the network adapts.
individuals, e.g. to apply for a passport: every citizen has a name, address, etc. However,
when a uniform approach is used for cases where there is diversity in the public, difficulties
may arise. A single template cannot predict beforehand all cases, and usually makes simple
cases complicated. An example can be seen with certain tax declarations, that include very
specific sections that only few people must fill in, but are delivered to everybody, even if
they just need to sign and declare that they had no income. And changes in the taxation
policies can make it complicated enough to pay somebody to fill in a declaration. Rather
than including all possible cases in a single form, a more reasonable approach would be to
contextualize the situation, providing individual solutions for specific cases. Electronic media
make this feasible, by generating instant options depending on the current circumstances.
Contextualizing interactions will reduce frictions, internal and external, because both
agents involved in the interaction would be benefited if delays are reduced by removing con-
siderations that do not apply for the current situation. Certainly, too much contextualization
can be counterproductive, since agents need to learn how to deal with each case. If every
case requires new decisions, then expertise will not be able to improve the performance of
agents.
What could be done is to categorize contexts into common occurring categories, by using
one of many well known techniques for automatic classification or clustering. Returning to
the tax declaration example, people who filled in similar parts of the form can be automat-
ically classified into a contextual category, such as pensioners or unemployed. Like this, a
system can find automatically which contexts are common, and what measures should be
10
taken only for those contexts. Since this would be a continuous process, new contextual
categories can arise and old ones may disappear. The advantage is that these changes are
lead by the usage of the bureaucracy itself, satisfying its demands.
8 A Toy Model: Random Agent Networks
To have a better feeling of the usefulness of the ideas described so far, a simple computa-
tional model can be used to measure the performance of abstract bureaucracies, represented
as “random agent networks” (RANs). This model, partly inspired by random Boolean
networks (Kauffman, 1969; Kauffman, 1993; Wuensche, 1998; Aldana-Gonza´lez et al., 2003;
Gershenson, 2004b), tries to make as few assumptions as possible about the structures of
bureaucracies.
A RAN consists of N nodes. A node represents an agent, which could represent a person,
a department, or a ministry. Each agent i solves a task. To do so, it sends requests toKi other
agents, which can be called “dependencies” or connections. The dependencies of every agent
are chosen randomly at the beginning of a simulation, not to assume any structure. Once
the agent receives a response from all its dependencies, the task is complete. However, the
dependencies might receive several requests from several agents. Thus, they store requests
in a queue, which they attend in a first-come, first-served basis2. Time is also abstracted,
so agents take one time step to send requests (transmission delay), one time step to answer
one request from the queue (decision delay), and one step to integrate the responses and
complete a task (decision delay). Once a task is complete, agents start a new task. Agents
respond requests from their queue only when they are expecting responses from their own
dependencies.
The performance of the network can be measured by the number of tasks it is able
to complete. Thus, the time “wasted” by agents while waiting for responses from their
dependencies (response delay) and having an empty queue should be minimized.
Now, there are many possible ways of randomly assigning dependencies to agents. The
simplest would be homogeneous, where each agent has exactly K dependencies chosen
randomly. Following a normal probability distribution, every agent will have on average
K dependencies, so some agents will have more and some will have less. A more natural
distribution would be scale-free (Aldana, 2003), where few agents have several dependen-
cies, and most agents have not so many3. Intuitively, a special topology where every agent
receives the same number of tasks should obtain the best performance, so that workloads
are distributed equitably, not allowing request queues to grow for particular agents. A (non
random) topology where every agent connects to K neighbours, similar to cellular automata,
fulfills this requirements. This topology can be called symmetric.
The RAN model was implemented in a computer simulation written in the Java pro-
gramming language. The reader can try the simulation and download the source code via
2For simplicity, in the model dependencies do not propagate: requests from queues are answered in
one time step. In real bureaucracies, some of these requests might require further requests to further
dependencies.
3More precisely, the number of dependencies for each agent is generated with the probability distribution
P (x) = (γ − 1)x−γ
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the website http://rans.sourceforge.net
As an initial state, all agents send requests to their dependencies. Afterwards, agents are
updated sequentially each time step, i.e. there are N updates per time step. The behaviour
of the network converges to a periodic or quasi-periodic pattern, i.e. an attractor. Interesting
parameters to observe are the response delays (how long it takes an agent to complete a task,
which is determined by how quickly its dependencies are able to process its requests) and
queue lengths (how many requests an agent has yet to process). An example of the dynamics
of these parameters can be seen in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Dynamics for a random agent network of N = 25, K = 5 with homogeneous
topology for 200 time steps. a) Response delays. b)Queue lengths. Lighter colours indicate
higher values. The initial state is the leftmost columns, and the subsequent columns show
the temporal evolution of the RAN.
Except for the symmetric topology, for any values of N and K, the task queues seem to
converge typically to a power law distribution: there are few long ones (bottlenecks), and
many short ones.
8.1 Using self-organization to improve performance
If we see the satisfaction of agents in terms of the tasks they are able to complete, the
satisfaction will be lower when the response delay is higher. Agents with longer queues
cause more friction than others, because they cause a high response delay on the agents that
are dependent on them, i.e. they have a high previous task delay. Thus, a natural way of
reducing friction would be by restructuring the network in such a way to reduce the longest
queues.
A very simple criterium achieves this. To restructure a RAN, the agent with the maximum
queue average (A) is detected. Then, the agent with a maximum response delay (B) that has
as a dependent the agent with the longest queue changes its dependency to the agent with
the shortest queue (C). This mechanism is illustrated in Figure 5. In many cases, the agent
with highest response delay (A) has the agent with longest queue (B) as its dependency.
This is natural, since B will be able to complete its task only when A reaches the request
after processing its queue. It is obvious that changing the dependency of B from A to C
will reduce the response delay. What is not obvious is the precise effect that this will have
on the network performance.
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Figure 5: Self-organization mechanism: The agent with highest delay (B) restructures its
dependency from the agent with longest queue (A) to the one with shortest (C).
8.2 Simulation Results
To compare the scale-free with the other topologies, this was normalized to have a total
number of dependencies in the network very close to N ∗ K.4 The networks with normal
topology also were checked to have a comparable number of dependencies, since networks
with less dependencies are able to process more tasks.
Simulation runs were performed for different parameter values. For a network size of
N = 15, for each topology, 1000 RANs were created, and their response rate (average tasks
completed per time step) was plotted as the self-organization was iteratively applied each
1000 time steps. For K = 1 (Figure 6), the scale free topology performs even better than
the symmetric one. This is because there is usually only one or few nodes with lots of
dependencies, and many nodes with few or no dependencies. The latter ones are able to
complete their tasks quickly, since they have little or no interference from the delays of
other nodes, and this enables them to respond quickly to the demands of the former ones.
Note that there is already a certain hierarchy and modularity inherent in this configuration.
As self-organization restructures the RANs, the non-symmetric topologies increase their
performance, and after few reorganizations, the homogeneous and normal topologies also
perform better than the symmetric. These two have initially bad performance because
randomly some nodes are dependencies of more than one node, while others are dependency
of none. This creates queues that affect all the nodes that share busy dependencies. By
changing the dependency to idle agents, the idle agents are still able to complete their own
tasks, while serving as dependencies of other nodes, and reducing the overall friction in the
network.
ForK = 2 (Figure 7), before self-organization, the symmetric topology performs the best.
After few self-organizations, the homogeneous topology achieves the same performance, while
the normal and scale free surpass it. This is because of the same reason explained above: if
4More precisely, γ = 2.48 was used, since networks with this value have similar properties to K = 2
(Aldana, 2003). Then, the probability was multiplied by K/2, to normalize.
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Figure 6: Results for N = 15, K = 1.
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some nodes have several dependencies while these have few, overall they are able to process
more tasks than if every node has the same number of dependencies: the nodes with few
dependencies are able to process their own tasks quickly, and to respond to the agents with
many dependencies promptly, creating certain hierarchy and modularity at the same time.
A similar case is seen for the case when K = 5 (Figure 8).
Figure 7: Results for N = 15, K = 2.
As K increases, it becomes more difficult to benefit from having several dependencies,
since these will have also several dependencies. A high degree of connectivity also implies less
hierarchy and less modularity. Thus, initially all topologies perform worse than symmetric,
but through self-organization, they tend to reach a similar performance. This can be seen
for the extreme case when K = 15 (Figure 9).
The same behaviour as described above can be seen for larger networks (N = 100), for
K = 1 (Figure 10), K = 2 (Figure 11), K = 5 (Figure 12), and K = N (Figure 13) (for this
last case, only 25 networks were generated).
8.3 RAN Discussion
Many open questions remain in this model. However, the main goal was to illustrate the
benefits of self-organization. The simulation results showed that only a few modifications
of the network topology are required to increase performance to near optimal levels. For
higher values of K, more self-organizations are required, simply because there are more
15
Figure 8: Results for N = 15, K = 5.
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Figure 9: Results for N = 15, K = 15.
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Figure 10: Results for N = 100, K = 1.
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Figure 11: Results for N = 100, K = 2.
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Figure 12: Results for N = 100, K = 5.
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Figure 13: Results for N = 100, K = 100.
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dependencies in the network. Still, only a fraction of the total number of dependencies needs
to be reconfigured to enable a random network to achieve good performance.
Self-organization does not ensure optimality, but adaptability. For example, if the changes
in demand of a bureaucracy change the decision time for a task, this can reconfigure itself to
accommodate the change robustly. This can be useful for automatic detection of malfunctions
and initial response to them: if an agent “breaks down”, its queue would grow, but the agents
that have it as a dependency could rearrange their connectivity towards agents working
properly. Notice that the presented model assumes that all agents have equal decision
and transmission delays. However, weights could be used to model diversity in the delays of
agents. Also, if in a real bureaucracy some dependencies cannot be changed, self-organization
will find its way with the available flexible dependencies.
One remaining question is: when to stop self-organizing? In principle, self-organization
can continue without degrading the performance of the network, while ensuring its adapt-
ability. However, for the simple case presented here, there is no need of adaptation, so sooner
or later the self-organization will take the RAN to a previously visited configuration. Some
changes actually decrease slightly the performance, but the long run tendency is towards
the highest possible performance for a particular network. If it is known what is the desired
maximum performance, then that can be a criterium to stop the self-organization, but it is
not obvious to know beforehand the maximum performance.
RAN-like models might also be useful to study organizational robustness, i.e. how
well an organization can respond to node failure, using sensitivity analysis. For exam-
ple, redundancy of nodes can be useful to ensure functionality of key or problematic tasks
(Gershenson et al., 2006).
9 Conclusions
This paper presented suggestions to use self-organizing techniques to improve the efficiency
of different aspects of bureaucracies. All the improvements mentioned decrease different
delays within a bureaucracy, reducing frictions and leading to efficient adaptability and ro-
bustness. This is because increasing speeds of reaction and decision will allow a bureaucracy
to adapt quickly to unexpected changes, while preserving its functionality. In consequence,
the “satisfactions” of agents, wether internal or external, will be increased.
Standards and digital signatures certainly could be used to comply with the formalities
of bureaucracies. Using electronic media is not an impediment for this. The adoption of
these media is already underway, and it might bring in more benefits than just decreasing
transmission delays. They can effectively support different types of self-organization within
bureaucracies. The real value of self-organization will only be appreciated once it is applied
in these organizations. But the ideas presented here are encouraging enough to try.
Similar approaches could also be useful for other types of organizations: if frictions are
reduced, satisfactions will increase.
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